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Axel Honneth was already recognized as the leading figure in the ‘third 
generation’ of critical theory, long before he took up, in 1996, Habermas’s chair in 
Philosophy at Frankfurt and the directorship of the Institut für Sozialforschung.  This 
volume of translated essays, together with a recent volume in German and his 2005 
Tanner Lectures on reification, provide a good opportunity to triangulate Honneth’s 
developing work.  
 
Honneth’s first book, Critique of Power, published in 1986 and translated in 
1991, began from the widely shared view that the first generation of critical theorists, 
despite their astonishing cross-disciplinary and interdisciplinary range, lacked an 
adequate theory of social action.  With one foot in neo-marxist economics and the 
other in Freudian theories of personality and culture, they were well placed to analyse 
what capitalism does to human beings and their social and political contexts, but less 
focussed on counter-currents of resistance, which were anyway rather thin on the 
ground in the interwar period. (Erich Fromm’s prophetically gloomy study of the 
German working class provided empirical documentation of what was anyway 
evident.)     
 
Habermas rejected the pessimism of post-war critical theory, of what had 
come to be called the ‘Frankfurt School’, and his principal work, the Theory of 
Communicative Action, published in 1981, aimed to provide the missing theory of 
social action as well as a normative foundation for social criticism and what he came 
to call a discourse ethics.  For Honneth, this was the starting point, but he felt that it 
needed to be complemented by Foucault’s analysis of power and a more prominent 
theoretical, as opposed to merely political, focus on concrete social conflicts.
1
  Where 
Habermas had circled around Foucault, clearly fascinated by him
2
 but without 
entering into direct dialogue until just before Foucault’s death in 1984, Honneth, like 
Albrecht Wellmer in the second generation of critical theory, was happy to engage 
with post-modern and post-structuralist thought.
3
 
The chronologically first essay collected in Disrespect, ‘Moral Consciousness 
and Class Domination’, originally presented at the legendary Dubrovnik Center4 in 
1981, sets the substantive focus for Honneth’s subsequent work.  He begins with the 
central principle of critical theory, which goes back to Hegel’s critique of Kantian 
morality, that effective critique must not be grounded in abstract principles but must 
also have a social foundation.     
 
If a theory is to do more than merely appeal to the ethical standards upon which it 
bases its critique, then it must prove the existence of empirically effective forms of 
morality upon which it can legitimately build. (p.80)  
 
 
Honneth is not yet using the term recognition,
5
 but his focus on injustice, in which 
connection he cites Barrington Moore (1978) and George Rudé (1980), contains the 
basic theme of his next major book.  Habermas, he suggests, has escaped the 
pessimistic trap of earlier critical theory by his notion developed in his 
‘reconstruction’ of historical materialism, of a process of moral evolution 
complementary to the evolution of the productive forces.  But Habermas’s model, he 
suggests, ‘is constructed in such a way that it must systematically ignore all forms of 
existing social critique not recognized by the political-hegemonic public sphere’ 
(p.82).
6
  Honneth, in other words, is concerned to reach the parts which Habermas 
cannot: ‘all those potentialities for moral action which have not reached the level of 
elaborated value judgements, but which are nonetheless persistently embodied in 
culturally coded acts of collective protest, or even in mere silent “moral disapproval” 
(Max Weber)
7.’ (p. 83)  After discussing some of the obstacles to the explicit 
articulation of such feelings of injustice, he restates this idea a little later (p. 86): 
‘Since neither its value premises nor its ideas of justice are transparent, the inner 
morality of the consciousness of social injustice can be grasped only indirectly on the 
basis of standards posed by the moral disapproval of social events and processes.’  
 
 It seems to have been an earlier period in the Hegel Archive,
8
 and the work of 
the Hegelian philosopher Ludwig Siep (1979; 2006) which led Honneth to pick on the 
Fichtean and Hegelian notion of recognition (Anerkennung).  As he writes in the 
Introduction to The Struggle for Recognition (p.1), he had reached the conclusion in 
Critique of Power that  
  
any attempt to integrate the social-theoretical insights of Foucault’s historical 
work within the theory of communicative action has to rely on a concept of 
morally motivated struggle.  And there is no better source of inspiration for 
developing such a concept than Hegel’s early, ‘Jena’ writings, with their 
notion of a comprehensive ‘struggle for recognition’.   
 
 
The rest is history.  The concept of recognition has become massively influential in 
critical social theory and the focus of numerous books.  To put it very briefly, 
Honneth ranges over developmental psychology and object relations theory, Mead, 
Marx, Sorel and Sartre (among others), distinguishing three variants or domains in 
which recognition is in play: love, rights and self-esteem grounded in solidarity.   
As he summarises the theory in his inaugural lecture at Berlin, delivered shortly after 
the book was published and reprinted here as Chapter 3
9
,  
 
I distinguished three forms of social recognition which can be regarded as the 
communicative presuppositions of a successful formation of identity: 
emotional concern in an intimate social relationship such as love or friendship, 
rights-based recognition as a morally accountable member of society and, 
finally, the social esteem of individual accomplishments and abilities. (p.74)   
 
 
What recognition is contrasted with is not misrecognition
10
 but disrespect, seen as the 
motor and idiom of social conflicts.  As the Internationale goes, ‘nous ne sommes 
rien, soyons tout’, or at least let us be acknowledged for what we are.   
 
 It cannot I think be denied that this concept captures a good deal of the notions 
of natural justice which motivate many social movements of exploited or suppressed 
people.  Strikes, notoriously, often begin with an apparently trivial violation of some 
perceived right rather than the broader context of ongoing exploitation.
11
   Critics of 
the concept have however argued, with more or less emphasis, that there is something 
flimsy about it.  If Habermas is thought, in a typical caricature of his theory of 
communication, to reduce moral and political conflict to a seminar discussion, 
perhaps Honneth is reducing it to the senior common room or salle des professeurs, 
with its petty slights and interminable resentments.  Nancy Fraser, in particular, has 
argued for the importance of issues of redistribution, in a friendly critique of 
Honneth’s emphasis on recognition.12  The complexity of these issues exceeds the 
scope of a review essay, but it may be worth mentioning a body of work which 
Honneth and Fraser have not, I think, discussed but which is highly germane to this 
issue.  Richard Wilkinson has for many years been analysing the relation between the 
degree of inequality in societies and their mortality and morbidity rates.  Crudely, 
inequality is bad for your health.  The immediate question is of course what 
mechanisms are responsible for these effects, and Wilkinson has increasingly come to 
stress more qualitative notions of social distance and, in Honneth’s terms, socially 
engineered disrespect.  ‘It may simply be that larger class differences lead to a steeper 
social gradient in health, but it could also be that a more unequal society becomes 
more dominated by status competition and class differentiation and suffers a more 
widespread health disadvantage as a result.’13  
 
 The range of current social conflicts with which Honneth engages in his own 
work and in that which he encourages at Frankfurt is enough to refute charges that the 
concept of recognition is in some way narcissistic and insubstantial, but it may be 
partly with these criticisms in mind that he tackled, in his Tanner Lectures at Berkeley 
in 2005, the grand Marxist theme of reification.  Reification in the sense in which 
Lukács (not Marx, as Gillian Rose showed in the first of her brilliant books)
14
 used it 
is the treatment of social relations between people as relations between things.
15
  In 
his account of reification, Honneth stresses the sense of ‘forgetting’ pointed to by 
Horkheimer and Adorno in their Dialectic of Enlightenment: ‘All reification is a 
forgetting’.16  To say, for example, that I need to shed ‘jobs’ from my business in the 
credit crunch is to forget, in this sense, that these are the jobs of the people whose jobs 
they are.  The same goes for, say, ‘collateral damage’ as measured in numbers of dead 
and wounded victims of military force.  Honneth’s aim, in a nutshell, is to detach the 
notion of reification from its original productivist philosophical anthropology and to 
show its relevance to a wide range of social pathologies as well as the capitalist 
exploitation and its mystification which was the focus of Lukács’ critique.  
 
 The translated volume includes, as well as Honneth’s characteristically 
brilliant lectures, a substantial introduction by Martin Jay and comments by Judith 
Butler, Raymond Geuss and Jonathan Lear.  Their critiques converge, to a large 
extent, on the theme I alluded to earlier, and I think Honneth’s stress on ‘forgetting’ 
encouraged a certain degree of misunderstanding of his project.
17
 The book remains 
however an exceptionally useful contribution and one which brings out the ways in 
which Honneth’s work as a whole reworks the tradition of critical theory and its 
antecedents in the classical German philosophy of Kant and Hegel so as to bring it to 
bear on current concerns as well as those which, like the poor, are still with us.  
 
Critical theory, for Honneth, is alive and well as resuscitated by Habermas;
18
 it 
needs to be tweaked back into a direction which one could call post-marxist, if the 
term had not been attached to rather different intellectual and political projects, and 
which also recalls Marx’s early concern with a wide variety of social conflicts.19 In 
the last part of this review I shall concentrate on these more general and programmatic 
aspects of Honneth’s work.  
 
Most important of these, I think, is his bold rehabilitation of a strong notion of 
social pathology which had tended to be confined to seminar discussions of Durkheim 
and journalistic phrases about our ‘sick’ societies. In the first essay in Disrespect, 
Honneth ties this to the tradition of ‘social philosophy’ which, as he notes, has 
withered away in the Anglo-Saxon countries into a sub-discipline of political 
philosophy.  Against this current, Honneth aims to restore it in relation to ‘processes 
of social development that can be viewed as misdevelopments…’ (p. 4).  The 
‘diagnosis of the times’, a term introduced into Britain by Karl Mannheim, becomes 
specifically a diagnosis of social pathology, Thus ‘In order to be able to speak of a 
social pathology that is accessible to the medical model of diagnosis, we require a 
conception of normality related to social life as a whole.’ (p.34)  In what he calls ‘a 
weak, formal, anthropology’ (p. 42)20, Honneth gestures towards ‘an ethical 
conception of social normality tailored to conditions that enable human self-
realization’. (p. 36)  
 
 This important initiative makes explicit something which had been latent in 
much of critical theory.  The theme of suffering of misdevelopment and ‘damaged 
life’ (Adorno 1951) pervades the work of the first generation of critical theorists, and 
Habermas’ reworking in Theory of Communicative Action of Marxist, Weberian and 
indeed Parsonian theory (Holmwood, 2009) contains a substantial discussion of social 
pathologies.  Honneth has however pushed this theme further, against the limits of the 
organic analogies and functionalist assumptions which he, like most of us these days, 
would find unacceptable. There is an excellent discussion of these issues by 
Christopher Zurn (2009), who notes at the beginning of his article that it has received 
much less attention than the theme of recognition.
21
   
 
This is brought out in what is more or less the title essay of the perhaps 
ambiguously titled Pathologien der Vernunft.  Geschichte und Gegenwart der 
Kritischen Theorie. In this essay, ‘A Social Pathology of Reason. On the intellectual 
heritage of critical theory’,  Honneth suggests that, although we are now a similar 
distance from the beginnings of critical theory as its protagonists were from the last 
representatives of classical idealism (p. 28), critical theory is still linked by its model 
of ‘…socially effective reason: The historical past is to be understood as a 
developmental process whose pathological malformation by capitalism can be 
overcome only by a process of enlightenment carried out by those affected.’ (p. 30)  
Critical theory therefore stands out in the present century against a context dominated 
by a liberal conception of justice which fails to ground its critique in social and 
historical explanation and by Foucauldian or hermeneutic lines of social criticism.
22
  
Together, these three books document one of the most striking features of Honneth’s 
work: the way in which he combines a return to the intellectual sources of critical 
theory with a thoroughly modern concern with contemporary social pathologies and 
with movements to overcome them. I believe there is still mileage in this tradition, 
and he is undoubtedly its leading contemporary practitioner.  
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1
 Habermas has of course always been a close observer of, and incisive commentator 
on, the contemporary political scene, but has tended to keep his political writings 
separate from his theoretical work.  The Postnational Constellation did not appear in 
the series of his political writings, but it bore the subtitle Political Essays. 
2
 See the two chapters devoted to him in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. 
3
 See, for example, Chapter 5 in this volume: ‘The Other of Justice: Habermas and the 
Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism’. 
4
 The Inter-University Center was, as much as or more than Frankfurt, the crucible of 
third-generation critical theory, bringing together thinkers from West Germany and 
the English-speaking world.  More importantly, of course, it was a meeting-point 
between East and West in a still divided Europe.  The session I attended a couple of 
years later was probably fairly typical, including, for example, Wellmer from 
Germany, Ferenc Feher (then in Australia) and Mihaily Vajda from Hungary, and 
Andrew Arato, Jean Cohen, Joel Whitebook and Drusilla Cornell from the US. 
5
 The term had cropped up in Habermas’s speech of 1974 on receiving the Stuttgart 
Hegel Prize, ‘Can Complex Societies Construct a Rational Identity’.  Here he writes 
of ‘a flexible identity in which all members of the society can recognize themselves 
[wiedererkennen] and acknowledge [anerkennen], i.e. respect [achten] one another’.  
This essay was reprinted in 1976 in Habermas’s book Zur Rekonstruktion des 
historischen Materialismus which forms the starting point of Honneth’s paper.  See 
Müller-Doohm (2008: 41), where I was reminded of this passage. 
6
 Here of course Honneth is implicitly referring to Habermas’s classic analysis of the 
public sphere and its deterioration under conditions of modern democracy. 
7
 Honneth is referring here, he says, to Weber’s Economy and Society, vol. 2 p. 929. 
8
 See Honneth’s discussion in London in March 2007 with Peter Dews, as reported by 
Robert Farrow (http://blackthumb.wordpress.com/2007/03/30/honneth-in-london/). 
9
 ‘The Social Dynamics of Disrespect: On the Location of Critical Theory Today’, pp. 
63-79. This and Chapter 4, which I mentioned earlier, are probably a good route into 
the book as a whole.  Other chapters cover the history of critical theory, themes of The 
Struggle for Recognition such as the family and emotional ties, the human subject and 
human rights, and aspects of the work of Dewey and Isaiah Berlin.  
10
 Recognition in German here would be wiedererkennen, rather than the sense of 
acknowledgement conveyed also by Anerkennung (cf. Jay, 2008).  Habermas, as 
quoted above (n,.4), interestingly uses both terms, and Achtung or respect, which in 
its negative form gives ‘disrespect’.  
11
 An early book by Scott Lash (1984) on worker militancy in France and the US 
comes to mind as an example.   
12
 See, for example, Fraser and Honneth, 2003, and the more hostile critiques by Lois 
McNay (2007, 2008). 
13
 Wilkinson and Pickett, 2006: 1775; see also Wilkinson, 2005. 
14
 This has a lesson for all of us who pretend to some form of scholarship.  Everyone 
she spoke to said that of course Marx used the term throughout his work; they 
couldn’t of course say just where, off the cuff, and so on.  One day I triumphantly 
pointed out a use of the term buried in volume 3 of Capital (which of course was 
published posthumously and therefore might not count), but this is very much the 
exception which proves the rule.  
15
 I deliberately use the ambiguous term treatment, since what is at issue is not a 
purely cognitive process. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
16
 This quotation appears as one of two epigraphs at the beginning of the lecture 
series; the other is from Wittgenstein, On Certainty: ‘All knowledge is based on 
acknowledgement’ (Anerkennung). 
17
 Having given a hostage to fortune with an example of someone forgetting themself 
in the heat of a sporting contest, Honneth clarifies in his ‘Rejoinder’ that his real 
starting point was reflection on industrialised mass murder. 
18
 See for example Honneth 1985 and Chapters 3 and 5 in Disrespect.  
19
 See Lubasz, 1977.  I do not of course mean to suggest that Marx lost, or Habermas 
lacks, these concerns; just that the focus on the proletariat in Marx’s later work, and a 
more diffuse notion of humanity as a whole in Habermas’, might be complemented by 
an approach which engages with a wide range of substantive conflicts. As Joel 
Anderson (2009) notes, ‘few outside Germany follow the Frankfurt School tradition 
of combining interpretations of classic texts…with both critical social theory and 
social scientific research’.   
20
 In the sense, of course, of philosophical anthropology (see Honneth and Joas, 1980) 
21
 I am grateful to Gordon Finlayson for drawing this to my attention. See also Zurn 
2005.    
22
 On the last of these, see his discussion of Michael Waltzer in the final essay in the 
book: ‘Idiosynkrasie as Erkenntnismittel’ (pp. 219-34).  The other essays in the 
volume, with the exception of a superb one on morality and philosophy of history in 
Kant, mostly discuss aspects of critical theory from Adorno and Benjamin, who is 
particularly important for Honneth, to Albrecht Wellmer.    
 
